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I am delighted that we could ar-
range to have a cross-section of
bankers, business executives, and
other professional leaders in the
San Francisco area meet with us
today. As you were informed, this
is the occasion of the Annual Joint
Board Meeting of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco
and its fou r branches.
Chairman Wilson, as the historian
in our group, has reminded us of
the historic forces which pre-
ceded the establishment of the
Federal Reserve and which
brought it into existence over 60
years ago. He has also introduced
the Boards of Directors of this
Bank and its branches, which rep-
resent important elements in the
structure of the Federal Reserve
System.
Today, I would like to describe
some of the current forces oper-
ating on the Federal Reserve, and
then examine the causes and pos-
sible cures for the dangerous in-
flationary spiral we are now wit-
nessing. However, before getting
to these topics, I think that it
would be appropriate to say a few
words for our guests about the
role of a Federal Reserve Bank
and its directors in the context of
today's problems. For I am often
asked, "Just what does a Federal
Reserve Bank do? And what is the
authority and responsibility of
your directors?" It happens that
the Federal Reserve System has a
policy of rotating its directors
after a certain period of service. It
is likely, therefore, that some of
our guests today might be ap-
proached in the future and asked
to consider serving as a director.
If so, I hope you would give it
favorable consideration.
Role of the Directors
The Board of Directors of a Fed-
eral Reserve Bank has a unique
function in that it combines some
of the traditional responsibilities
of directors in a private corpora-
tion with the special responsibil-
ities of contributing to the formu-
lation of public policy. This dual
role has evolved from the unique
structure of the Federal Reserve
itself-i.e., part government and
part private, guided by a central
authority in Washington, but with
twelve semi-autonomous Federal
Reserve Banks.
As the nation's central bank, the
Federal Reserve System's basic
responsibilities fall into three
basic categories: (1) to regulate
the flow of money and credit in a
manner that contributes to eco-
nomic growth without inflation;
(2) to supervise and examine
those commercial banks which
are members of the System, to
regulate bank holding compa-
nies, and to oversee the foreign
activities of U.S. banks; and (3) to
prOVide numerous "wholesale"
3central banking services, such as
provision ofcurrencyand coin,
operation of a check collection
system, and service as fiscal agent
forthe U.S. Treasury.
The central policy-making body in
the Federal Reserve System is the
Board of Governors, appointed
bythe President and confirmed
by the Senate. The twelve re-
gional Federal Reserve Banks
share certain ofthe responsibil-
ities relating to monetary policy
with the Board of Governors,
administer various regulations,
and provide the "wholesale"
banking services noted earlier.
Thus, the Federal Reserve System
is characterized by coordinated
control through the Board of
Governors and by decentralized
administration through the Re-
serve Banks.
The affairs of each Reserve Bank
are conducted under the supervi-
sion and control of its Board of
Directors, subject to general su-
pervision by the Board of Gover-
nors. The Board of Directors of
each head office of a Reserve
Bank consists of nine members,
three of whom (including the
Chairman and Deputy Chairman)
are appointed by the Board of
Governors as representatives of
the general public. The public
members may not be officers,
directors, employees or stock-
holders of any bank. he re-
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maining six directors at each
Head Office are lected by the
member banks, which own all the
stock in the Federal Reserve Bank.
Of these six, three are representa-
tives ofthe member banks and
are usually actively engaged in
banking; and the other three
must be actively engaged in
commerce, industry, or agricul-
ture, and may not be officers,
directors, or employees of any
bank.
Similarly, for each branch of a
Federal Reserve Bank, the Board
of Governors appoints certain
directors as representatives of the
public interest, while the majority
of the branch directors are ap-
pointed by the Head Office
Board. The affairs of each Branch
office are conducted under the
control of its Board of Directors,
subject to general supervision by
the Head Office Board.
Thus, a Federal Reserve Bank is a
privately-owned institution with a
public purpose. Except for a divi-
dend on member-bank stock,
which is limited by statute to 6%,
the great bulk of our earnings is
paid over to the U.S. Treasury. A
Reserve Bank has a certain degree
of regional autonomy, but it is
also partof a national system.
The Federal Reserve System is a
unique blend of publ"c interest
and private representation of
"grass roots" interests. In mean-
ingful ways, it reflects the tradi-
tional belief in this country in a
system of checks and balances.
This type of organization has
served the countrywell, in my
opinion.
Ourdirectors are successful men
in many fields ofendeavor-
business, finance, agriculture and
universities, to name a few. They
provide counsel and advice to
ensure that the Bank has c1early-
defined goals and objectives, and
programs for reaching them, and
they have the responsibility for
overseeing the efficiency of oper-
ation and quality of management.
In the area of economic intellig-
ence, our directors provide us
with information on the economy
weeks or even months before
developments are reflected in
national economic data. At other
times their first-hand information
reminds us that ours is a diverse
economy in which developments
in many industries and regions of
acountry can run counter to na-
tion-wide trends.
Ourdirectors also provide infor-
mation and insights on the proper
course for public policy, and they
can add substance to their views
by recommending changes in the
Federal Reserve discount rate.This is the rate which the Federal
Reserve Bank charges for loans to
its member commercial banks,
and it is one of the tools of mone-
tary policy. Although the Board of
Governors in Washington has the
ultimate authorityto approve or
disapprove a proposed change in
the discount rate, it is s rongly in-
fluenced by the "grass-roots"
reaction expressed by the direc-
tors, especially if the directors of
anumber of Federal Reserve
Banks make the same recommen-
dation.
One of the major strengths of the
decentralization of the Federal
Reserve System is its ability to
draw on the best talent in various
regions of the economy to serve
as directors with the foregoing
responsibilities.
Role of the Federal Reserve
The unique structure of the Fed,
which I believe gives it unusual
strength in performing its job,
also subjects it to criticisms by
those who do not appreciate its
role and its structure.
The Federal Reserve has at least
two elements which make it insti-
tutionally unique. First, it is inde-
pendent within, butcertainly not
from, the Federal Goverment.
More specifically, it is an inde-
pendent agency but with ultimate
responsibility to the Congress,
and it is not apartof the Executive
Branch. Second, the decision-
making process within the Fed-
eral Reserve System is decentral-
ized in the sense that it is shared
by the Board of Governors in
Washington with the twelve re-
gional Federal Reserve Banks. I'd
like to say afew words about each
ofthese functions.
When Congress and the Adminis-
tration established the Federal
Reserve in 1913, it was deliber-
ately made an independent insti-
tution within Government, in
order to free itfrom day-to-day
political influence. Senator Carter
Glass, the architect ofthe original
Federal Reserve Act, hoped that
the System would act as a "Su-
preme Courtof Finance." That
hope has been at least partly ful-
filled overthe decades. The es-
tablishment of the Federal Re-
serve System as the central bank
indicated that Congress believed
that monetary policy was too
important to leave to private
bankers. On the other hand, the
fact that Congress, over the years,
has specified 14-year terms for
members of the Board of Gover-
nors in Washington, and 5-year
appointments for Presidents of
the regional Reserve Banks, indi-
cates that monetary policy also is
too important to be left to the
day-to-day pressures from the
political arena. The goal was to
establish a Federal Reserve
System which is responsive to the
long-term economic needs of the
nation in an objective and non-
partisan way.
Over the years there have been a
number of attempts to erode the
independence of the Fed. There
have been repeated legislative
proposals to retire the capital
stock of the Reserve Banks, to
eliminate their directors, to cen-
tralize all powers of the Fed in
Washington, and to make the
System more directly amenable to
influence by the Congress.
A current example is abill sched-
uled forvote in t e House of Rep-
resentatives in the near future,
which would provide for afull-
scale auditand review by the
General Accounting Office of the
finances, operations and mone-
tary policy actions of the Federal
Reserve System. Although we are
completely in favor of audits in
the traditional sense, we are op-
posed to the bill forseveral rea-
sons. With respect to financial
transactions, the Federal Reserve
Board is already thoroughly au-
dited by a nationally-known CPA
firm, and the results are reported
to Congress. In turn the Board
performs exhaustive examina-
tions of the Federal Reserve
Banks, in addition to thework of
5the resident auditing staff at each
Bank which reports directly to the
Board of Directors. Secondly, the
Federal Reserve System, both at
the Board of Governors and at the
Reserve Banks, has in place effec-
tive and hard-hitting programs
aimed at operational efficiency.
Thus a financial audit and an "effi-
ciency" audit by the GAO would
merely duplicate effective pro-
grams already in place.
The really serious objection,
however, has to do with the pro-
posed policy review by the GAO.
In our view, this could be an en-
tering wedge for direct Congres-
sional control over monetary
policy-with consequent adverse
effects on the economy if such
control were to be influenced by
partisan goals and political pres-
sures. Forty years ago, the Con-
gress wisely decided to remove
the Federal Reserve System from
the scope of the GAO, in order to
provide for independence of
judgment on the part of the
System in carrying out the res-
ponsibilities delegated to it by
Congress. We believe that it
would be unwise to change that
arrangement.
A second unique feature of the
Federal Reserve is the decentrali-
zation of policy making. The Fed-
eral Open Market Committee
(FOMC), one of the two major
policy-making bodies of the Fed-
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eral Reserve, meets once a month
in Washington to decide on the
course of open market opera-
tions, the most important instru-
ment of monetary policy. The
majority of the FOMC consists of
the seven members of the Board
of Governors. The remaining five
members are drawn from the
twelve Reserve Bank Presidents,
on a rotating basis. But those
Presidents who are not currently
voting members have an oppor-
tunity to attend the meetings and
express their views. Thus, the
formulation of monetary policy
benefits from regional inputs and
from a variety of viewpoints.
Role of the San Francisco Bank
The advantages of a decentralized
Federal Reserve System extend
beyond strictly policy-related is-
sues. Let me describe some of
those that I am most familiar with,
using the experiences of the San
Francisco Bank.
Until very recently, banking struc-
ture in the Twelfth Reserve Dis-
trict, with its state-wide branch
banking, was relatively unique in
the nation. The Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco has
brought these special institutional
factors to the attention of the
Board of Governors, and in most
cases obtained regulatory treat-
ment which is suitable to this par-
ticular bank structure.
The Reserve Bank in San Fran-
cisco also has taken an active
interest in developing the West
Coast as an international financial
center. It has encouraged a legal
and regulatory environment fa-
vorable to international banking
operations, and has attempted to
get government and financial in-
stitutions to consider the longer-
run developmental interest of our
financial markets. The Bank itself
is in the process of strengthening
its own research capability with
regard to the Pacific Basin area
and will assist in the growing fi-
nancial integration of trading
partners in this region.
Over 90 percent of the budget of
the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco is expended to prOVide
payments mechanism services,
currency and coin, fiscal agency,
and other services to govern-
ment, banks, and to the economy
in general. In my view, the decen-
tralized organization of the Fed-
eral Reserve System promotes ef-
ficiencies in these operations
because the System's semi-au-
tonomous Reserve Banks can ad-
just their procedures to local
conditions; they can innovate in
improving the quality and re-
ducing the cost of service; and
they can recruit and challenge
better staff.Two examples may illustrate this
point. The Federal Reserve Banks
issue virtually all new currency in
circulation and are responsible
for retiring and destroying unfit
currency. More currency is issued
and destroyed in the Twelfth Dis-
trict than anywhere else in the
nation. To do this job more effi-
ciently, the Bank is experimenting
with a number of methods, in-
cluding some automated ones,
for verifying and destroying worn-
out currency. Another example is
in the area of improving the pay-
ments mechanism. The San Fran-
cisco Reserve Bank operated the
first automated clearing house in
the nation, and electronic funds
transfers were first processed by a
Reserve Bank computer in the
Twelfth District. We expect to
continue to take a leading role in
this field and to support commer-
cial bank efforts to reduce the
flow of paper checks.
Perspectives on Inflation
I would now like to turn to the
major economic problem facing
the nation today-namely,
rampant inflation that is occurring
even in the face of a softening in
economic activity. It may be
helpful to put this problem in his-
torical perspective, before at-
tempting to assess the possible
cu res.
EffectofBudget Deficits. During
the first half of the 1960's, the
United States enjoyed a period of
sustained and stable economic
growth, with very little inflation.
The origins of our cu rrent prob-
lems seem to lie in the major es-
calation of the Vietnam war
starting about mid-1965.
Government deficits increased at
an alarming rate in the Vietnam
build-up period of 1965-68, when
the economy was at, or near, full
employment. President Johnson
perceived a lackof popular sup-
port for the war and was fearful
that his "Great Society" spending
programs might get scuttled if he
asked Congress for a tax increase.
He therefore elected initially to
finance expanded military com-
mitments in South Asia with gov-
ernment debt. The deficits which
resulted from this decision were
temporarily relieved by the be-
lated income-tax surcharge in
mid-1968, and by a leveling off in
military expenditures at about the
same time. However, the fiscal
situation deteriorated further in
1969-70 when outlays for civilian
programs outstripped recession-
reduced revenues, and became
still worse in the 1971-72 period
when recovery from the recession
.got underway.
The persistence of substantial
government deficits regardless of
the phase of the business cycle
has been a major source of the
inflation that is now built into the
U.S. economy, in myview.
Monetary Policy Undermined. It
can be argued that a tighter mon-
etary policy ought to be able to
offset the inflationary effects of
large, sustained deficit financing.
In theory this may be true, but in
practice the opposite tends to
occur. When huge Federal credit
demands are added to those of a
fully-employed private sector,
interest rates tend to escalate.
There are some sectors of the
economy, such as housing con-
struction and programs financed
with municipal bonds, that are
especially sensitive to such a de-
velopment because they depend
heavily on long-term credit.
When these sectors are con-
fronted with high interest rates,
demands for relief are quickly
heard. Moreover, the U.S.
Treasury itself has a natural desire
to finance its deficits at the lowest
feasible cost.
In short, large-scale deficit fi-
nancing by the Government tends
to bring great pressures on the
central bank to keep interest rates
from risingto"unreasonable,"
"unacceptable," or "dangerous"
levels. You may recall that about a
year ago there was a serious
threat in the Congress to freeze
interest rates, or even roll them
back to the level of January 1,
1973.
7Obviously, the only way that
mounting credit demands can be
satisfied without an increase in
interest rates is for the Federal
Reserve to accelerate the growth
of money and credit. If donefor
too long, or to an excessive de-
gree, such action can generate
inflationary pressures which may
persist for a lengthy period.
It has been myobservation that
large and persistent Federal defi-
cits are a leading factor in pulling
monetary policyoff course, in the
direction of excessive monetary
expansion, as the central bank
attempts to cope with the con-
flicting pressures that develop
from such a situation. Too often
in practice, therefore, an expan-
sionary fiscal policy tends to gen-
erate excessive expansion in
money and credit.
Priority ofEmployment Coal. A
second factorwhich tends to in-
hibit the use of monetary policy in
combatting inflation is an unre-
solved conflict in national goals as
between full employment and
stable prices. Since the early
1960's in the U.S., achievement of
the "full employment" goal has
usually contemplated an unem-
ployment rate of4% or less. Such
a rate was regarded by many as a
practical minimum, in view of
normal shiftingof workers be-
tween jobs and the lack of mar-
ketable skills of some job-
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seekers. However, present evi-
dence su ggests that structural
shifts in the labor force during the
last decadewould now make the
"practical minimum" about4.5%
or 5%, especially in view of the
increase in the labor force repre-
sented by teen-agers and other
new entrants into the labor force
who often lack marketable skills.
In myview, there has not been
enough refined analysis of the
employment and unemployment
data, concentrating on the "hard
core" of our laborforce-i.e.,
heads of households or
"breadwinners"-forwhom the
social and economic costs of
unemployment are highest.
Among this group, the unemploy-
ment rate in January of this year
was only2.8%, in contrast to the
conventional or aggregate unem-
ployment rate of 5.2%.
Studies by the Brookings Institu-
tion indicate that the conven-
tional unemployment rate
seriously understates the tight-
ness of labor markets. Similarly,
studies by our Bank indicate that
it takes a higher rate of inflation
now to achieve a4 percent unem-
ployment rate than it did ten years
ago. This is due to two factors:
first, the changing structure of the
labor force has brought higher
participation rates forworkers
with marginal skills; second, in-
creased inflation expectations
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have caused labor to demand
larger wage increases even at
times when the unemployment
rate is relatively high. Ifwe should
nowattempt to follow a monetary
policy aimed at reducing unem-
ployment to 4%, the likely conse-
quence would be to exacerbate
present inflationary pressures,
which have already reached dan-
gerous levels.
For whatever reason, there has
been a tendency for the goal of
"full employment" to take
priority over stable prices, in view
of actions in recent years by the
Administration and Congress-
whose job it is to determine na-
tional priorities. Not enough at-
tention seems to have been paid
to the trade-off-i.e., the addi-
tional inflation that must be ac-
cepted to get a lower unemploy-
ment rate. In essence, my
argument is that we have both a
faulty diagnosis as well as the
wrong medicine for the unem- 'I'
ployment goal. First we need a
more meaningful "target rate" for 1
unemployment, as I've explained.
Secondly, we need new percep-
tions and new remedies for un-
employment. Rather than im-
posing inflation on everyone, by
attempting to reach our employ-
ment goal through expansive
monetary and fiscal policies, our
aim should be a more vigorous use
of selective measures to deal with
the problem. These measurescould include low-interest educa-
tionalloans to youth and minority
groups, retraining programsdi-
rected toward skills where job
vacancies are high, and steps to
facilitate worker mobility.
Lags in Monetary Policy Impact. A
third factor which tends to inhibit
the use of monetary policy in
combatting inflation, and to call
for its use by the Administration
or the Congress to provide short-
term stimulus to the economy, is
a technical one. This factor has to
dowith the lags in the impact of a
change in monetary policy on
production, employment, profits
and prices. While the technical
reasons are complicated and
while our knowledge in this area
is imperfect, it seems reasonably
clear that the lags are longer for
an impact on prices than for the
impact on the other measures
noted.
Thus, the "good news" about
easy money appears first-i.e.,
favorable effect on production,
employment, and profits; while
the "bad news" comes later-
i.e., inflation. Conversely, if a
tight money policy is adopted, the
bad news comes first-i.e., unfa-
vorable effects on production,
employment, and profits;
whereas the good news is
delayed-i.e., a reduced rate of
inflation. Under these circum-
stances, it is not su rprising that
elected officials who must face
the voters at a given time would
prefer to see easy money.
Has Monetary Policy Been Too
Expansive? Thus, it may be asked,
has monetary policy been a prin-
cipal cause of our inflation prob-
lem, and is there a simple cure in
the form of tight money? In re-
cent testimony before the Con-
gress, the Chairman of the Board
of Governors, Arthur F. Burns,
acknowledged that, with the ben-
efit of hindsight, monetary policy
may have been overly-expansive
in 1972. Some of our critics, such
as Professor Milton Friedman,
would go much further-alleging
that the money supply has grown
too fast si nce about 1970, and that
this played a major role in pro-
ducing the current inflation.
Such criticism, whether or not
justified, is easy enough to make,
based both on monetarytheory
and statistical studies. But it
seems to me to ignore real prob-
lems in the real world. No central
bank can be or should be wholly
independent of Government. The
elected representatives of the
people of the U.S., both the Con-
gress and Administration, must
have the ultimate responsibility
for economic policy, and that in-
cludes monetary policy. In to-
day's world, a central bank that
consistently defied its govern-
ment on major issues would
quickly be taken over by the gov-
ernment.
I have been attempting to convey
an understanding of some of the
forces that impinge on the
freedom of action of the Federal
Reserve System in using tight
money to combat inflation.
Whether by accident or design,
our Federal budget has ?een
characterised by large deficits in
most recent years, giving rise to
very large financing needs and to
higher interest rates, to a point
where serious damage was threat-
ened in some sectors of the
economy and where many mem-
bers of Congress were in a mood
to freeze interest rates. Also,
whether based on a faulty analysis
or a misplaced emphasis, those
elected officials with ultimate
responsibility for economic policy
have placed a high priority on the
"full employment" goal, even at
the expense of stable prices. Cen-
tral banks cannot completely ig-
nore such imperatives-even
against their better judgment.
It seems to me that our best hope
lies in a better understanding of
the long-run inflationary damage
done to our economy by exces-
sive monetary and fiscal stimulus
and by over-emphasis on employ-
ment targets, whatever the short-
run benefits. It is vital that this
matter be thoroughly appreciated
not only by the Congress and the
Administration, but also by the
business and financial community
and the general public. It is only
9in this way thatwe can get sup-
port for the belt-tightening mea-
sures needed to overcome the
corrosive problem of rampant in-
flation.
Price Controls-Hidden Inflation.
In completing the analysis of the
basic causes of inflation in recent
years, I would note that the
problem was compounded by
price controls. The "new eco-
nomicpolicy" implemented by
the Administration in Augus of
1971 had some favorable price
effects in its initial two phases
because excess capacity existed in
the economy and because the in-
flationary pressures were largely
of the cost-push variety in 1971
and early1972. However, by late
1972 and early 1973, the economy
was at Virtually full employment,
and continued wage-price con-
trols led mainlyto a misdirection
of resources and to artificial
shortages. Further, the illusion of
stable prices tended to conceal
for a while the effects of con-
tinued expansionary economic
programs. This illusion was rather
rudely shattered by the price
freeze experience last summer
when, for example, certain agri-
cultural sectors quite literally
began to shut down. By now,
popular support for wage-price
controls has declined to a point
where they probably will be
dropped almost entirelythis year.
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Special Causes ofInflation, 1972-
73. In addition to fiscal problems
and the nation's misadventure
with wage-price controls, three
other factors deserve special
mention in analyzing the origins
of our present inflation problem.
The first is the unprecedented
world-wide grain crop failure in
1972 that sent agricultural prices
through the roof. The second is
the fact that the business cycle in
virtually all industrial countries
was in acoincident boom phase
in 1973, which placed extreme
pressure on the supplies and
prices of internationally traded
goods. The third factor, of
course, was the unanticipated
imposition of the Arab oil em-
bargo last fall. Inappropriate fiscal
policies and overstaying the use-
fulness of wage-price controls
would have created difficult price
problems in any case-but these
policy mistakes in conjunction
with the special factors I've noted
produced an inflation problem of
epic dimensions.
Inflation and the Current Outlook
How do we get out of the ap-
parent box we have gotten our-
selves into? The first thing to
remember is that at this time our
main economic problem is a
shortage of oil, not money. The
current rise in unemployment
and the cutbacks in production to
this point have resulted primarily
from supply problems which
cannot be solved with monetary
policy. Even if a deficiency in ag-
gregate demand develops from
the supply-induced slowdown in
the economy, monetary policy
could do little to relieve the situa-
tion this year because of the lags
in its impact on the economy,
which I mentioned earlier. In
these circumstances, monetary
policy should be directed towards
1975 and beyond when the poli-
cies we adopt nowwill have their
major impact.
If we wish to overcome inflation,
it is going to be a long, hard uphill
battle, and our monetary-eco-
nomic time horizon must be ex-
panded to at least three years to
see the success of our actions.
Also, since there is a trade-off
between inflation and unemploy-
ment, we must be prepared to
accept at least a temporary rise in
the unemployment rate-even
after the energy problem is
solved-and to use special pro-
grams to ease the plight of those
affected. Such programs could
include liberalization of welfare
payments, increased unemploy-
ment benefits, and more public
employment. Whatever is done in
this regard, it is vital that we not
try to solve the unemployment
problem of the few, by imposing
inflation on everybody through
expansionary fiscal and monetary
measures.In the final analysis, itwill not be
possible to solve our inflation
problem without fiscal and mone-
tary restraint. For that reason, I
found it encouraging to note the
recent testimony before Congress
by the Secretary of the Treasury.
He warned against broad-based
increases in spending programs
or tax cuts as means of pumping
purchasing power into the
economy at this time. One can
only hope that his point of view
will prevail over that of an official
of the Office of Management and
Budget who was widely quoted
recently to the effect that the
Administration would "bust the
budget," if necessary, to combat
unemployment and any down-
turn in the economy in the
months ahead.
One can also hope that the
budget reform bill which has
passed the House will be enacted.
Under present procedures, a
large number of appropriations
bills are considered separately,
without regard to an overall ex-
penditure target, any assigning of
priorities, or sources of financing.
The budget reform bill would, for
the first time, give members of
Congress a chance to vote on
fiscal policy. Until such a measure
is passed, the balance between
expenditures and revenues will
continue to be a "happening"
rather than a policy-and with a
high likelihood of chronic defi-
cits.
Similarly, if we are to overcome
inflation, the Federal Reserve
System must be free to pursue a
non-inflationary growth target for
money and credit-even if higher
interest rates are necessary in the
short run, as inflationary forces
are wrung out of the economy. It
is particularly vital that we not be
pulled off course toward exces-
sive credit ease by the two major
forces that have done so in the
past-i.e., the necessity to fi-
nance large-scale budget deficits,
and the tendency to call for easy
money to solve unemployment
problems that could be handled
better through selective mea-
su res.
Conclusion
The fight against inflation this
year and in the years immediately
ahead will not be easy, but it is
absolutely essential. As Chairman
Burns stated in recent testimony
before Congress, continued infla-
tion will "reduce the dollar's
strength in foreign exchange
markets-destroy the gains we
have recently made in strength-
ening our competitive position in
world markets- ... undermine
confidence... send interest rates
soaring and wreck our chances of
gaining a stable and broadly
based prosperity in the near fu-
ture."
We are now on the verge of Latin-
American style inflation, mea-
sured in two digits. We must bite
the bullet now, because it will be
much harder to fight inflation the
longer we wait. This effortwill
require less expansionary mone-
tary and fiscal policies than we
have been following in recent
years. Ifwe are not prepared to
take these 3ctions, we will be
faced with turmoil, uncertainty
and economic instability for years
ahead. I am confident that the
people of this country, and its
leaders, have better sense.
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